Share 35 was implemented in 2013 to direct livers to the most urgent candidates by prioritizing Model for End-Stage Liver Disease (MELD) 35 patients. We aim to evaluate this policy's impact on costs and mortality. Our study includes 834 wait-listed patients and 338 patients who received deceased donor, solitary liver transplants at Mayo Clinic between January 2010 and December 2014. Of these patients, 101 (30%) underwent transplantation after Share 35. After Share 35, 29 (28.7%) MELD 35 patients received transplants, as opposed to 46 (19.4%) in the pre-Share 35 era (P 5 0.06). No significant difference in 90-day wait-list mortality (P 5 0.29) nor 365-day posttransplant mortality (P 5 0.68) was found between patients transplanted before or after Share 35. Mean costs were $3,049 (P 5 0.30), $5226 (P 5 0.18), and $10,826 (P 5 0.03) lower post-Share 35 for the 30-, 90-, and 365-day pretransplant periods, and mean costs were $5010 (P 5 0.41) and $5859 (P 5 0.57) higher, and $9145 (P 5 0.54) lower post-Share 35 for the 30-, 90-, and 365-day posttransplant periods. In conclusion, the added cost of transplanting more MELD 35 patients may be offset by pretransplant care cost reduction. Despite shifting organs to critically ill patients, Share 35 has not impacted mortality significantly.
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The Share 35 policy was implemented by United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) in June 2013 with the intention of reducing geographic disparities in organ access for liver transplantation across the United States. (1) By prioritizing regional transplant candidates with a Model for End-Stage Liver Disease (MELD) score of 35 or higher over local candidates with MELD scores under 35, this measure was expected to prolong survival of patients wait-listed in underserved organ distribution areas. (2, 3) At the same time, it was hypothesized that this policy could reduce global transplant costs in the interim by reducing pretransplant health care expenses. (4, 5) Out of the more than 6000 liver transplants that are performed every year within the United States, (6) approximately 20% take place in patients with MELD scores of 35 or higher-a proportion that increased to 25% within the first 6 months of the Share 35 policy's implementation. (4) Postoperative costs in patients with MELD scores of 35 or above have been found to be significantly higher than in patients with lower MELD scores due to longer intensive care unit and hospital stays, as well as more frequent hospitalizations. (7) These higher postoperative expenses, in conjunction with the foreseeable increase in transportation costs linked to the new allocation system, (8) warrant a total cost analysis to gauge the direction of Share 35's effect on global transplant costs.
In order to evaluate the Share 35 policy's efficiency, it is necessary to address 2 questions pertaining to survival benefit and cost of care. First, it is necessary to determine whether death rates on the waiting list have in fact been reduced, as well as to evaluate whether the policy has had a positive or negative impact on posttransplant mortality. Second, a cost analysis is justified in measuring the difference in pre-and post-Share 35 transplant costs; the policy's effect on pretransplant, posttransplant, and global health care costs should be considered in this analysis. Herein we report a singlecenter analysis of patient mortality and health care costs over the pre-and post-Share 35 era to assess the impact of this policy change.
Patients and Methods

PATIENTS
Data were collected from the Mayo Clinic Transplant Center Database for analysis. We included 892 waitlisted patients and 338 patients who received a deceased donor, solitary liver transplant at this institution between January 2010 and December 2014. Both 90-day wait-list mortality and 1-year posttransplant mortality were evaluated. This study was approved by the Mayo Clinic Institutional Review Board, and only consenting patients were included for study.
Standardized inflation-adjusted cost estimates were generated for these patients in order to compare costs between transplants in patients with MELD scores 35, and MELD scores <35, as well as before and after implementation of the Share 35 policy. No actual cost data were used. Instead, the Mayo Clinic Cost Data Warehouse employs valuation techniques to remove discrepancies between billed charges and true resource use, yielding cost estimates in constant dollars based on line detail on goods and services provided (excluding outpatient pharmaceutical costs).
(9) The 30-, 90-, and 365-day pretransplant and posttransplant medical care costs were analyzed. Patients who received a retransplant or died within 5 days of their first transplant are excluded from the posttransplant cost analysis; patients who received a retransplant or died within 40 days of their first transplant are excluded from the 90-and 365-day posttransplant cost analysis; and patients who received a retransplant or died within 180 days of their first transplant are excluded from the 365-day posttransplant cost analysis. Repeat sensitivity analyses were performed by considering separately hepatitis C virus (HCV)-positive and negative patients, as well as by including patients who received a simultaneous liver-kidney (SLK) transplant and patients who received early retransplants to assess the impact of these subgroups on costs.
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
Statistical software packages SAS 9.4 (SAS Institute Inc., Cary, NC) and R 3.1 (R Foundation for Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria) were used for data analysis. Median and interquartile range (IQR) or mean and standard deviation (SD) for numerical variables and frequency and percentage for categorical variables were used to summarize the data. Differences and associations between groups were compared using chisquare and t tests as appropriate. Cost data were analyzed using multivariate linear regression when appropriate. Time to death or last follow-up was analyzed using Cox proportional hazard and Kaplan-Meier methods for both wait-list and posttransplant survival. Multivariate models were determined using stepwise model selection adjusted for age and sex. P values < 0.05 were considered statistically significant.
Results
DEMOGRAPHICS
Data were collected on a total of 338 patients who underwent single-organ, deceased donor liver transplant at Mayo Clinic between January 2010 and December 2014. Of these patients, 237 (70%) underwent transplantation prior to Share 35, and 101 (30%) underwent transplantation after the policy came into effect. Globally, 75 (22.2%) patients had a MELD score 35 at the time of transplantation. When contrasting pre-and post-Share 35 data, a greater proportion of patients had MELD scores of 35 or above at transplantation after the policy's implementation: 29 (28.7%) patients in the Share 35 era, as compared to 46 (19.4%) in the previous time frame (P 5 0.06). The MELD score distribution of the pre-and post-Share 35 transplant recipient populations is illustrated in Fig. 1 . Basic demographics of the transplant recipient and wait-list mortality study populations are represented in Table 1 .
MORTALITY
We observed 159 deaths in the 892 wait-listed patients, and 23 out of the 338 transplant recipients died within 1 year of transplant. No significant difference in 90-day wait-list mortality was found between patients listed before or after the implementation of Share 35 (P 5 0.08). The implementation of Share 35 maintained marginal significance after adjusting for MELD scores 35 (P 5 0.08). MELD scores 35, however, were found to have a significant association with wait-list mortality (P < 0.001; see Table 2 ).
Similarly, no evidence of a significant difference in posttransplant mortality was found between patients transplanted before or after the implementation of Share 35 (P 5 0.68). In this case, MELD scores 35 were not found to correlate significantly with mortality (P 5 0.98). Kaplan-Meier patient survival curves are represented in Fig. 2 . The median follow-up time for patients in the pre-Share 35 era was 3.2 years (IQR, 2.2-4.2 years) whereas in the post-Share 35 era the median follow-up time was 1.2 years (IQR, 0.9-1.6 years).
COSTS
As seen in Table 3 , which shows adjusted 30-, 90-, and 365-day pretransplant and posttransplant health care costs of both pre-and post-Share 35 transplants, the global mean cost for the 30-day pretransplant period in all patients was $13,695 (SD, $24,813). Associations between mean cost, MELD score, and Share 35 from the univariate and linear regression models are represented in Table 4 . Univariately, mean 30-day 
On combination of pretransplant and posttransplant costs for a global pre-versus post-Share 35 cost analysis, no significant difference was found in total costs at 30, 90, and 365 days between the pre-and post-Share 35 eras, as shown in Table 4 . On repeat sensitivity analysis for HCV-positive and HCV-negative subgroups, SLK transplants, and early retransplants, the general trends and associations in costs remained the same, without any large deviations (Supporting Tables 1-5) .
DISCUSSION
This study was conducted to assess the efficiency of the Share 35 policy, taking into account its impact on mortality as well as on global health care costs. Data were gathered from the 3.5 years immediately prior to the implementation of Share 35 and the first 18 months of the post-Share 35 era. A better understanding of the impact of Share 35 may be useful in assessing its success, or need for modification. 
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When evaluating survival benefit, several studies have examined the impact of MELD scores on pretransplant and posttransplant mortality. The consensus seems to be that, although MELD scores are useful predictors of wait-list mortality, (10, 11) and therefore a practical tool in liver allocation, (12, 13) their influence on posttransplant mortality is weaker (14) or not as clear and may be more dependent on other factors including the patient's age and diagnosis. (15) Higher MELD scores have been identified as independent risk factors for morbidity (16) but not mortality (17) by some authors. Other authors have suggested that high pretransplant MELD scores, along with other factors, are associated with high posttransplant mortality, (18) but our data did not show this dependency. We found neither a significant difference in posttransplant mortality between patients transplanted with MELD scores above or below 35, nor between patients transplanted before or after Share 35 came into effect. This confirms what was found on a national level by another study: no significant difference in survival between patients transplanted preand post-Share 35, with regional variations. (19) The fact that higher MELD scores translate into a higher wait-list mortality, without significantly impacting posttransplant mortality, is coherent with the Share 35 policy's intention of reducing wait-list mortality in regions where patients typically experience longer waiting periods for organ reception, while avoiding futile transplants and promoting efficient use of scarce donor organs. (20) The survival benefit of allocating livers to high-MELD candidates, who by definition are at a higher risk of pretransplant death, has been well documented.
(21) Nevertheless, we could not demonstrate a decrease in wait-list mortality rates thus far, which is consistent with the results of another study based on UNOS data. (22) It is important to take into account, however, that our survival data are limited to a single center and could simply be a reflection of the limited statistical power.
As expected, our study showed that the Share 35 policy has increased the percentage of organs that are made available to patients with MELD scores of 35 and above. (23) However, other authors have postulated that although offers to patients with MELD scores 35 increased, overall acceptance rates decreased; centers were less likely to accept a specific liver for a MELD 35 patient after the policy change. (24) At the same time, the proportion of patients transplanted with lower MELD scores (in the 10 to 25 range) also increased, as suggested in Fig. 1 , which may mean that because organs from standard criteria donors are now being allotted to MELD 35 recipients, more livers from marginal donors are distributed to low MELD patients.
Financially, the question was raised whether possible increased costs of Share 35 could be absorbed by the health care system, given that high-MELD patients are associated with increased costs. (25) One study calculated projected increased health care expenditure associated with broader sharing of liver allografts to be of $17,056 per quality-adjusted life-year saved, a value that would be considered cost-effective, (26) with the potential for preventing 88 deaths annually. (27) These data, however, were obtained through simulation analysis before adoption of the Share 35 policy. Furthermore, it was predicted that liver acquisition costs would increase considerably for organ procurement organizations with the new allocation system, (28) and it seems that has been the case. (29) Although beyond the scope of this study, this should be taken into account when evaluating Share 35.
Our cost analysis revealed that although pretransplant and posttransplant costs were significantly higher in the MELD 35 cohort patients, transplant costs changed very little when Share 35 was implemented. Pretransplant costs decreased slightly but nonsignificantly for 30 and 90 days, but this decrease was statistically significant for the 365-day pretransplant period. Posttransplant costs increased slightly for 30 and 90 days and decreased slightly for 365 days, but none of these differences were significant. After adjusting for MELD 35, posttransplant costs were somewhat lower during the Share 35 era, although these differences were not significant. Still, this suggests that the added cost of transplanting sicker patients with MELD scores 35 may actually be offset by reducing their pretransplant health care costs through earlier transplantation, which is in agreement with the economic reasoning behind Share 35. (4) Our global cost analysis was consistent with this, as it showed no difference between pre-and post-Share 35 total health care costs at 30, 90, and 365 days. These data contradict the results of a previous study, which reported high MELD scores to be associated with higher health care costs both prior to and at the time of liver transplantation, but not higher posttransplant costs. (30) However, the consensus seems to be that MELD scores affect costs more significantly in the early posttransplant period, with longterm costs being more dependent on other factors, such as donor risk index. (31) The current study is based on single-center data. Therefore, its external validity to the general health care context should be considered when interpreting its results. It is evident that actual resource use following discharge from the transplant center may vary considerably from patient to patient, and that this resource use may occur at a number of different facilities, making complete financial data very difficult to obtain. For this reason, our follow-up of costs does not extend beyond 1 year and does not include outpatient pharmaceutical costs. Finally, the study does not include health care costs for those patients still on the waiting list that have not received a transplant. More data are necessary to reach a clearer estimate of the difference between transplant costs in the pre-and post-Share 35 eras. It would also be interesting to consider further the impact of etiology of liver disease beyond HCV status, but this would require larger number of patients to provide meaningful results.
In summary, our single-center analysis suggests that the Share 35 policy has increased liver allocation to the MELD 35 population without a significant increase in posttransplant mortality. In other words, the policy has achieved its primary goal of prioritizing organ distribution to MELD 35. In addition, though there was a slight and nonsignificant increase in posttransplant costs, this seemed to be roughly offset by a slight decrease in pretransplant cost. Further analysis is warranted to assess the policy's effect on wait-list mortality and overall cost-effectiveness.
